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This publication is motivated, in part, by 
the huge increase in ethanol production 
capacity in the U.S. in the past two 
years and the impact that increase is 
having on corn and other commodity 
prices. The current fixed ethanol subsidy 
was established in an era of cheap oil, 
but with oil around $60, the subsidy 
provides very large profits to ethanol 
producers and thereby a substantial 
incentive for the industry to grow. With 
this industry growth, demand for corn 
grows in parallel and thus its price. This 
publication reviews the history of U.S. 
ethanol policy, explains the economics 
of ethanol production in today’s market 
environment, and outlines some policy 
alternatives that could be considered for 
the future.
U.S. Ethanol Policy History
Ethanol has been produced for fuel in 
the United States for at least 26 years. The 
industry launch was initiated by a subsidy 
of 40 cents per gallon provided in the 
Energy Policy Act of 1978. Between 1978 
and today, the ethanol subsidy has ranged 
between 40 and 60 cents per gallon. The 
history of subsidy changes is provided 
in Table 1. The federal subsidy today is 
1978 Energy Tax Act of 1978 $0.40 per gallon of ethanol tax exemption on the $0.04 gasoline excise tax
1980 Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act and the Energy Security Act Promoted energy conservation and domestic fuel development
1982 Surface Transportation Assistance Act Increased tax exemption to $0.50 per gallon of ethanol and increased the gasoline excise tax to $0.09 per gallon
1984 Tax Reform Act Increased tax exemption to $0.06 per gallon
1988 Alternative Motor Fuels Act Created research and development programs and provided fuel economy credits to automakers
1990 Omnibus Budget  Reconciliation Act Ethanol tax incentive extended to 2000 but decreased to $0.54 per gallon of ethanol
1990 Clean Air Act amendments Acknowledged contribution of motor fuels to air pollution
1992 Energy Policy Act Tax deductions allowed on vehicles that could run on E85
1998 Transportation Efficiency Act of the 21st Century
Ethanol subsidies extended through 2007 but reduced to $0.51 per gallon of 
ethanol by 2005
2004 Jobs Creation Act 
Changed the mechanism of the ethanol subsidy to a blender tax credit instead 
of the previous excise tax exemption. Also extended the ethanol tax exemption 
to 2010.
2005 Energy Policy Act Established the Renewable Fuel Standard starting at 4 billion gallons in 2006 and rising to 7.5 billion in 2012.
Source: (Commerce, 2006) North Dakota Chamber of Commerce.
Table 1. History of Ethanol Subsidy Legislation
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51 cents per gallon. Throughout all the history, the 
subsidy has always been a fixed amount that does not 
change with crude oil price or corn prices (Tyner and 
Quear, 2006).
In addition to the federal blending credit subsidy, 
there are also some other federal and state subsidies. 
In fact, Koplow (2006) calculates the total subsidy 
available for ethanol in 2006 to range between $1.05 
and $1.38 per gallon of ethanol or between $1.42 and 
$1.87 per gallon of gasoline equivalent. Many would 
regard these figures as being high, but they do dem-
onstrate that the ethanol industry has been one with 
substantial subsidies.
Ethanol Economics
Ethanol gets its value from the energy it contains and 
its additive value. Ethanol has value as a gasoline ad-
ditive because it contains more oxygen than gasoline 
(and therefore causes the blend to burn cleaner) 
and because it has a much higher octane than gaso-
line (112 compared with 87 for regular gasoline). 
Historically, ethanol prices have been higher than 
gasoline prices because of the additive value and be-
cause of the federal and state subsidies.
Figure 1 provides the monthly ethanol and gasoline 
prices for Omaha, Nebraska, between 1982 and 2006. 
In Figure 1, one can see that the relationship between 
gasoline and ethanol prices began to change in 2002. 
Figure 1 also contains the regression fits for the entire 
period and for the separate periods 1982-2001 and 
2002-2006. The coefficients are all significant, and the 
regressions explain between two-thirds and three-
fourths of the variance in ethanol prices. 
Except for the summer of 2006, the spread between 
ethanol and gasoline was greater in earlier years than 
in the period 2002 and after. Ethanol even fell below 
gasoline for a few months in 2005, leading some to 
believe that the “natural” price for ethanol would 
be on an energy-equivalent basis with gasoline. The 
spread increased substantially in summer 2006 be-
cause of a change in federal rules that took effect May 
8, 2006.
As of that date, the federal requirement for blend-
ing a certain percentage of oxygen ended. One of 
the major sources of oxygen had been a compound 
named “MTBE.” However, this compound is highly 
toxic and was found in the water supplies in several 
areas and banned by many states. With there no lon-
ger being a requirement to blend a certain amount of 
oxygen, many companies feared legal prosecution if 
they continued to use MTBE and switched to ethanol, 
which increased substantially the demand and price 
of ethanol.
Components of Ethanol Value
As indicated above, there are three components to the 
market value of ethanol: energy, additive, and sub-
sidy. It is interesting to portray these values in terms 
of the relationship between crude oil price and the 
maximum a corn dry mill could afford to pay for corn 
at each crude price. To estimate such a relationship, 
many assumptions were needed, and these assump-
tion are detailed in Appendix A.
Figure 2 displays the relationships between crude oil 
price and breakeven corn price on the basis of energy 
equivalence, energy equivalence plus additive value 
(assumed to be 25 cents per gallon for this illustra-
tion), and energy equivalence plus additive value plus 
the current federal blending subsidy of 51 cents per 
gallon. The energy equivalence line was done as-
suming a figure of 70%, slightly more than the direct 
energy equivalent.
Figure 1. Historic Ethanol and Gasoline Prices (Omaha, NE)
Purdue extension
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Figure 2. Breakeven Corn and Crude Prices with Ethanol Priced 
on Energy and Premium Bases plus Ethanol Subsidy
Using Figure 2, one can trace out the breakeven corn 
price for any given crude oil price. For example, 
with crude oil at $60/bbl., the breakeven corn price 
is $4.82/bu., including both the additive premium 
and the fixed federal subsidy. This figure is for a new 
not all the subsidy gets passed through to dry millers 
and to the corn price. The first sensitivity assumes the 
subsidy is effectively 40 cents instead of 51 cents. The 
breakeven corn price with the fixed subsidy becomes 
$4.50 instead of $4.82.
Next, suppose that the additive value is 30 cents per 
gallon instead of 25. The corn breakeven price be-
comes $5.02. With the additive value of 40 cents, the 
corn breakeven becomes $5.37. There is no doubt that 
ethanol has an additive value as an oxygenate and for 
octane, but it is impossible to predict what it will be 
as ethanol production increases beyond the needs for 
octane and added oxygen. 
Another type of sensitivity would be to assume that 
ethanol might be priced equivalent to gasoline on 
a volumetric basis instead of an energy basis. Some 
argue that in the long term refiners will choose to 
modify their refining process to produce a lower oc-
tane gasoline, say 84 octane, which could be blended 
at 10% ethanol to produce the standard 87 octane 
regular gasoline.
We conducted two sensitivity analyses—one with 
the supplemental additive value then at zero and one 
with the additive value at 20 cents. With volumetric 
equivalent pricing and no additional additive value, 
the corn breakeven becomes $6.20. With volumetric 
pricing and 20 cents additional additive value, the 
corn breakeven becomes $6.89. In all these cases ex-
cept the lower subsidy pass through, dry millers could 
afford to pay more for corn than in the base case. 
Combinations of these cases could be done as well, 
but the approximate outcomes can be inferred from 
these results.
During most of the history of the federal ethanol 
subsidy, crude oil prices ranged between $20 and 
$30 per barrel. With crude oil price in that range, the 
fixed federal subsidy did not put significant pres-
sure on corn prices. However, with crude oil today 
around $60, there is significant pressure on corn 
prices. Ethanol investments in the United States have 
been highly profitable during the past two years, with 
payback periods as short as one year.






Subsidy pass-through equal to $0.40 instead of $0.51 $4.50
Additive value equal to $0.30 instead of $0.25 $5.02
Additive value equal to $0.40 instead of $0.25 $5.37
Ethanol priced equal to gasoline on a volumetric basis instead 
of energy basis with no supplemental additive value $6.20
Ethanol priced equal to gasoline on a volumetric basis instead 
of energy basis with $0.20 supplemental additive value $6.89
plant and includes 12% return on equity and 8% debt 
interest. If we consider an existing plant with capital 
already recovered, we add $0.78 per bushel to yield a 
breakeven corn price of $5.60.
Sensitivity Analysis
Any number of sensitivity analyses could be per-
formed on the calculations contained in this publi-
cation. Table 2 provides results on some important 
sensitivity analyses. All the reported results are the 
corn breakeven for $60 crude oil. First, suppose that 
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This high profitability has attracted significant new 
investment in the industry, as shown in Figure 3. 
Ethanol production grew 1 billion gallons in 2006 
and is expected to grow 3 billion gallons in 2007, a 
doubling in two years. Because of this current and 
expected future growth in ethanol production, corn 
prices skyrocketed in fall 2006. In just a few months, 
prices were up from about $2.25 to $3.70 per bushel, 
an increase of about 65%. This leap in corn prices is 
leading to an emerging opposition to ethanol subsi-
dies on the part of animal agriculture, export markets, 
and other corn users. Some are also concerned about 
the $4 billion cost of the subsidy in 2007.
• Find a way to limit the quantity of ethanol that 
would receive the subsidy, thereby permitting bet-
ter control of the growth of corn-based ethanol.
• Provide higher subsidies for cellulose-based 
ethanol in hopes of accelerating development and 
implementation of that technology.
• Convert the subsidy from a fixed subsidy to one 
that varies with the price of crude oil.
No Changes
Certainly, one option is to do nothing—to let the 
other corn-using sectors adjust to higher corn prices. 
But as can be seen from the results in the ethanol 
economics and sensitivity analyses sections above, 
that option could lead to substantially higher corn 
prices than we have seen historically. It certainly 
would lead to higher costs for the livestock industry 
(happening already) and ultimately for consumers of 
livestock products. It also would lead to reduced corn 
exports. The breakeven corn prices provided above 
are maximums the ethanol industry could pay to 
retain profitability. 
Whether these prices would be reached would de-
pend on the rate of growth of the ethanol industry 
compared with the rate of growth of corn supply. 
According to the Renewable Fuels Association, the 
operating ethanol capacity as of 29 December 2006 
was 5.386 billion gallons, and 6.004 billion gallons 
were under construction (Association, 2007). Part of 
the 6 billion gallons under construction will come on 
stream in 2007, leading to a substantial increase in 
corn demand. We can certainly expect to see contin-
ued pressure on corn prices if no change is made in 
federal subsidy policy.
Lower Fixed Subsidy
Because the current pressure on corn prices comes 
from the combination of $60 oil and 51 cent per gal-
lon subsidy, one option would be to maintain a fixed 
subsidy but lower it to a level more in line with the 
higher oil price. Figure 4 depicts the corn breakeven 
prices with a 20 cent per gallon subsidy instead of the 
current 51 cent per gallon subsidy. The corn break-
even price for $60 oil becomes $3.77 instead of $4.82 
Figure 3. Ethanol Production
Future Policy Alternatives
In essence, the situation is that we are living an un-
intended consequence of the fixed ethanol subsidy. 
When it was created, no one could envision $60 oil, 
but today $60 oil is reality, and many believe oil prices 
are likely to remain high. So given this reality, what 
future federal policy options could be considered that 
would support the ethanol industry but provide less 
incentive for rapid growth in the industry leading to 
abnormally high corn prices? There are several pos-
sible policy alternatives that could be considered:
•	 Make no changes, and let the other corn using sec-
tors (particularly livestock) adjust as needed.
•	 Keep the subsidy fixed, but reduce it to a level 
more appropriate for crude oil prices around $60.
Purdue extension
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Figure 4. Breakeven Corn and Crude Prices with Ethanol Priced on 
Energy and Premium Bases plus Lower Ethanol Subsidy
Figure 5. Breakeven Corn and Crude Prices with Ethanol Priced 
on Energy and Premium Bases plus Variable Ethanol Subsidy
under current policy. However, the fixed subsidy still 
has the disadvantage of not responding to possible 
future changes in oil prices. If oil fell to $40, the corn 
breakeven would be $2.40, and it would be $4.46 for 
$70 oil.
Variable Subsidy
In designing a variable subsidy, there are two key pa-
rameters: the price of crude oil at which the subsidy 
begins and the rate of change of the subsidy as crude 
oil price falls. We illustrate the variable subsidy using 
$60 crude as the point at which the subsidy begins. 
That is, when crude is higher than $60, there is no 
subsidy, but some level of subsidy exists for any crude 
oil price lower than $60. In this illustration, we use a 
subsidy change value of 2.5 cents per gallon of etha-
nol for each dollar crude oil falls below $60. Thus, if 
crude oil were $50, the subsidy per gallon of ethanol 
would be 25 cents. If crude oil were $40, the ethanol 
subsidy would be 50 cents per gallon. Therefore, for 
any crude oil price above $40, the ethanol subsidy 
would be lower than the current fixed subsidy. For 
any crude price less than $40, the subsidy would be 
greater than the current fixed subsidy of 51 cents per 
gallon.
Figure 5 illustrates the corn breakeven price for dif-
ferent crude oil prices if this variable subsidy were in 
effect. In this case, the corn breakeven price at $60 oil 
for a new ethanol plant would be $3.08 per bushel, Figure 6. Breakeven Corn and Crude Prices with Ethanol 
Priced on Energy and Premium Bases plus Variable and Fixed 
Ethanol Subsidy
compared to $4.82 with the fixed subsidy shown in 
Figure 3. With oil at $50, the corn breakeven would be 
$2.77 for a new plant with the variable subsidy. $40 oil 
would support a corn price of $2.27 for a new plant 
and $3.05 for an existing plant with capital recov-
ered. $70 oil would yield a breakeven corn price of 
$3.77 with no ethanol subsidy. So the variable subsidy 
provides a safety net for ethanol producers without 
putting inordinate pressure on corn prices.
The difference between the two subsidy approaches 
can be seen in Figure 6, which displays both the fixed 
and variable subsidies. Examining this figure, it is 
clear why the variable subsidy provides so much less 
pressure on corn prices. For any crude oil price above 
$60, there is no ethanol subsidy with the variable sub-
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sidy, so ethanol plant investment decisions are made 
based on market forces alone instead of being driven 
by the federal subsidy.
For any crude price between $40 and $60, the variable 
subsidy is less than the fixed subsidy, thereby provid-
ing less incentive to invest and less pressure on corn 
prices, but maintaining a safety net. However, with 
the fixed subsidy, ethanol plant investment decisions 
continue to be heavily influenced by the government 
subsidy, even at crude oil prices that render ethanol 
very profitable in the absence of a subsidy. Thus, the 
variable subsidy alternative is one option that merits 
further consideration in the policy decision process.
Other Alternatives
Two other options mentioned above were a) to find a 
way to limit the quantity of ethanol that would receive
the subsidy, thereby permitting better control of the 
growth of corn-based ethanol and b) to provide high-
er subsidies for cellulose-based ethanol in hopes of 
accelerating development and implementation of that 
technology. Either of these options could be imple-
mented with either the fixed or the variable subsidy. 
So long as corn-based ethanol is highly profitable, it 
will be difficult to stimulate investment in cellulose 
technology because it is much more uncertain and at 
present more costly than corn-based ethanol produc-
tion.
Conclusions
Ethanol has been subsidized in the U.S. since 1978, 
and the subsidy has ranged from 40 to 60 cents per 
gallon over that period. Currently, the subsidy is 51 
cents per gallon, and combined with $60 oil, ethanol 
production has become highly profitable. This prof-
itability has stimulated a huge increase in ethanol 
production capacity, with 6 billion gallons of new 
capacity under construction as of January 2007. This 
increase in ethanol production is increasing corn 
demand and prices. Under the current policy, ethanol 
producers could still invest profitably in new pro-
duction with corn price as high as $4.82/bu. Other 
assumptions could yield substantially higher corn 
prices.
 
If government is interested in reducing upward 
pressure on corn prices, alternatives to the current 
fixed 51 cent per gallon subsidy could be considered. 
One option would be to lower the fixed subsidy. This 
alternative would reduce the pressure on corn prices 
but would still provide ethanol subsidies under higher 
oil prices when they are not needed. It also does not 
change based on underlying market conditions.
A second option would be a variable subsidy that pro-
vided an ethanol subsidy that changes with the crude 
oil price. The option evaluated in this publication pro-
vided no subsidy for crude oil price above $60, and a 
subsidy that increased 2.5 cents per gallon for each $1 
crude price is below $60. This option yields a breakev-
en corn price for $60 oil of $3.08/bu., compared with 
$4.82/bu under the current policy.
Another option, clearly, is to make no change in cur-
rent policy. With this alternative, the other corn-using 
sectors such as livestock production and corn exports 
would be forced to make the needed adjustments. 
Less corn would be used in these sectors, and prices 
for all livestock products likely would increase.
Purdue extension
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The link between crude oil price and breakeven corn 
price requires numerous assumptions. Following 
are the most important assumptions updated to 
November 2006.
1)  relationship between crude oil price and 
gasoline price—This relationship is given by the 
equation below:
Wholesale gasoline price ($/gal.) = 0.3064 + 
0.03038 * crude oil price ($/bbl.)
The data for this equation was monthly data 2000-
2006 from EIA/DOE. However, longer and shorter 
time periods were tested, and the results are 
remarkably stable. The adjusted R2 for the equa-
tion is 0.93, meaning that 93% of the variability in 
gasoline price over time is explained by changes in 
the crude oil price.
2)  relationship between gasoline price and ethanol 
price—The energy equivalent price of ethanol is 
assumed to be 70% of the gasoline price. That is 
slightly higher than the pure energy equivalence.
3)  relationship between corn price and ddGs 
price—DDGS price is a function of the prices of 
corn and soybean meal as follows:
DDGS price ($/ton) = 1.52 + 0.205 * soybean meal 
price ($/ton) + 
21.98 * corn price ($/bu.)
Substituting a price for soybean meal of $200/ton 
into this equation yields the equation used in the 
model:
DDGS price ($/ton) = 42.52 + 21.98 * corn price 
($/bu.)
All data is from USDA, monthly 2003-06. Illinois 
prices were used for corn and soybean meal, and 
Lawrenceburg, IN, for DDGS.
It is assumed that 18 pounds of DDGS is produced 
per bushel of corn used.
Appendix A
4)  ethanol yield per bushel of corn is assumed to be 
2.65 gallons—Newer plants may have higher yield, 
but this figure is close to the industry average.
5)  Capital cost for the plant is assumed to be $1.80 
per gallon of capacity, which translates to about 
29 cents per gallon produced—Older plants had 
considerably lower capital cost, and much of the 
capital probably has already been paid off. The 
plant is assumed to operate at full capacity.
6)  Financial assumptions:
The plant is 40% equity and 60% debt finance.
The debt interest rate is 8%, and the equity return 
  is 12%.
7)  no value was assigned to the Co2 produced.
8)  energy costs:
Natural gas  $9.00/mil. BTU
LP   $1.20/gal.
Electricity  $0.06/KWH
Total energy  $0.383/gal. of ethanol
9)  other costs:
Chemical and enzyme costs $0.23/gal. of ethanol
Other processing costs  $0.09/gal. of 
ethanol
Given these assumed relationships and values, the 
Tiffany/Eidman (University of Minnesota) spread-
sheet model (2003) of a dry-mill ethanol plant was 
used to calculate profitability and thus derive the 
breakeven prices. Breakeven was assumed to be 
the point of zero economic profit; that is, it in-
cludes the payment of debt and stipulated return 
on equity. Clearly, any of these assumptions and 
values could be modified in the future as condi-
tions change.
Source: (Hurt and Tyner, 2006)
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